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I. Introduction
“I have the opinion of the Court this morning in case 12-96,
Shelby County versus Holder.”1
So began Chief Justice Roberts’s announcement2 of the
opinion in Shelby County v. Holder.3 Over the next seven minutes
and forty-two seconds, the Chief Justice summarized the
rationale and reasoning of the majority opinion,4 which had been
joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.5 The Chief
Justice concluded his announcement with the Court’s ruling:
When taking such extraordinary steps as subjecting state
legislation to preclearance in Washington and applying that
regime only to some disfavored states, Congress must ensure
that the legislation it passes speaks to current conditions. The
coverage formula, unchanged for 40 years plainly does not do
so and therefore we have no choice but to find that it violates
the constitution.6

The dissent from Justice Ginsburg that followed the Chief
Justice was the first voice in a chorus of criticism that rained
down on the Court after its decision.7 Some of the criticism
highlighted factual errors in the Court’s understanding of the

1. Opinion Announcement of Chief Justice Roberts at 0:00, Shelby Cnty.
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_12_96 (last visited Sept. 24,
2014) [hereinafter Opinion Announcement].
2. Id.
3. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
4. See Opinion Announcement, supra note 1, at 0:06–7:42 (recounting the
history of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and the Court’s rulings concerning it).
5. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2617 (listing the Justices who joined the
majority opinion).
6. Opinion Announcement, supra note 1, at 7:48.
7. See Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 0:00–0:06, Shelby Cnty. v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), available at http://www.oyez.org/
cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_12_96 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (noting that
beyond two points of agreement, “the Court divides sharply”).
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Voting Rights Act (VRA):8 one observer criticized the majority for
“[striking] down a statute that did not exist,”9 while another
wrote that “all three reasons Shelby County gives for the record’s
inadequacy are deeply puzzling.”10 Other criticisms focused on
the ruling’s effects: President Obama expressed deep
disappointment in the ruling, asserting that it “upset[] decades of
well-established practices that help make sure voting is fair,
especially in places where voting discrimination has been
historically prevalent.”11 Attorney General Eric Holder called
Shelby County “a serious setback for voting rights.”12 Nearly
every critique of the Court’s ruling also looked to the future and
how the federal government could use the undisturbed portions of
the Voting Rights Act to continue protecting the franchise.13 The
need for continued federal protections became apparent within
hours of the Court’s decision as states formerly covered by § 5
began to implement new voting-related legislation.14

8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).
9. Justin Levitt, Shadowboxing and Unintended Consequences,
SCOTUSBLOG.COM (June 25, 2013, 10:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2013/06/shadowboxing-and-unintended-consequences (last visited Sept. 24,
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. Ellen D. Katz, What Was Wrong with the Record?, 12 ELECTION L.J.
329, 331 (2013).
11. David Jackson, Obama “Disappointed” in Court’s Voting Rights
Decision, USATODAY.COM, June 25, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/
theoval/2013/06/25/obama-supreme-court-voting-rights-act/2455939 (last visited
Sept. 24, 2014) (quoting President Obama’s written statement responding to the
ruling) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. Id. (quoting Attorney General Holder).
13. See id. (quoting President Obama as saying that Shelby County “doesn’t
represent the end of our efforts to end voting discrimination” and calling for
legislative action); Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United States, Remarks at the
Nat’l Urban League Annual Conference (July 25, 2013), http://www.
justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130725.html (last visited Sept.
24, 2014) (announcing that the Justice Department would shift its focus “to the
enforcement of a number of federal voting laws not affected by the Supreme
Court’s decision”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See Associated Press, For Republicans, No Easy Answers on Voting
Rights Act, CBS NEWS (July 5, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
for-republicans-no-easy-answers-on-voting-rights-act (last visited Sept. 24,
2014) (“GOP officials in Texas and Mississippi promised within hours of the
decision to enforce new laws requiring voters to show identification at the
polls.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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One of those portions of the Voting Rights Act that remained
untouched by Shelby County is § 3(c)15—the “bail-in” or “pocket
trigger” provision.16 Section 3(c) authorizes a court presiding over
a successful voting rights suit to impose a preclearance regime on
the defendant jurisdiction, thus requiring the jurisdiction’s
subsequent voting-related changes to be approved by the court
before they can go into effect.17 In the wake of Shelby County,
Attorney General Holder specifically mentioned § 3(c) as one of
the tools the Department of Justice would use to continue
protecting voting rights.18 Lawsuits filed in North Carolina and
Texas have backed up the Attorney General’s promise, with the
federal government invoking § 3(c) in its prayers for relief.19
These decisions by federal authorities reflect the view of votingrights scholars that the § 3(c) pocket trigger is one of the better
immediate, short-term solutions to continuing to protect voting
rights after Shelby County.20
But using § 3(c) more frequently poses several practical
questions about its implementation. To date, only eighteen
jurisdictions have been brought under § 3(c)’s provisions, almost
all by consent decree.21 This scant implementation, specifically in
the adverse litigation context, provides little guidance about how
courts should apply § 3(c)’s retention-of-jurisdiction provision.
This Note addresses three major questions about implementing
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012). Although the Voting Rights Act is codified
in Title 42 of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, this Note will follow
convention by referring to provisions by their respective section numbers in the
original Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
16. See Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket
Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2006–09
(2010) (describing the mechanics of § 3(c)).
17. See id. (describing the mechanics of § 3(c)).
18. See Holder, supra note 13 (referring to provisions in the VRA to “‘bail
in’” jurisdictions “when intentional voting discrimination is found”).
19. See Complaint at 31, United States v. North Carolina, No. 13-cv-861
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2013) (requesting the court retain jurisdiction under § 3(c));
Complaint at 14, United States v. Texas, No. 13-cv-00263 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22,
2013) (same).
20. See Bruce E. Cain, Moving Past Section 5: More Fingers or a New Dike?,
12 ELECTION L.J. 338, 340 (2013) (identifying § 3(c) as one of “the best
[strategies] that [can] be done for the foreseeable future”).
21. See infra notes 143–46 and accompanying text (describing the history of
§ 3(c) implementation).
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§ 3(c) after Shelby County. First, which party bears, or should
bear, the burden of proof on the element of discriminatory
purpose for proposed voting changes subject to § 3(c)
preclearance, and should there be a presumption of
discriminatory purpose?22 Second, how long can courts retain
jurisdiction under § 3(c), should there be a default time period,
and under what conditions should a covered jurisdiction be
released?23 And third, what is the standard for appellate review
for § 3(c) relief, and does it change depending on whether the
appellant is challenging the initial imposition or challenging later
decisions by the court to disallow voting changes?24
This Note is organized as follows: Part II examines the
structure of the Voting Rights Act and the history of preclearance
litigation in the Supreme Court, from the early days of the Voting
Rights Act through Shelby County.25 Part III delves into the
specifics of § 3(c) preclearance and the constitutional issues it
poses, both before and after Shelby County.26 Part IV answers the
questions identified above.27 Finally, Part V examines the
proposed Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014 (VRAA),28 its
changes to § 3(c) specifically, and its effect on § 3(c)’s role in the
general scheme of federal voting-rights enforcement.29
II. A Brief Overview of the Voting Rights Act and § 5 Preclearance
A. The Voting Rights Act’s Basic Structure
Originally enacted in 1965, the Voting Rights Act contains
two “major substantive provisions”: §§ 2 and 5.30 Section 2
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Infra Part IV.A.
Infra Part IV.B.
Infra Part IV.C.
Infra Part II.
Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.
H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2014).
Infra Part V.
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 516 (4th ed.
2012). The Act also contains substantive and procedural provisions that are
beyond the scope of this Note but worth mentioning to illustrate the breadth of
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establishes “a nationwide prohibition against voting practices and
procedures . . . that discriminate on the basis of race, color or
membership in a language minority group.”31 Section 2 can be
enforced in litigation brought by the U.S. Department of Justice
or by private plaintiffs.32
Section 5, the “preclearance” provision, requires states and
local jurisdictions that meet certain criteria—laid out in the nowdefunct coverage formula of § 4(b)33—to obtain approval from the
Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for changes to their
voting practices.34 When the Supreme Court struck down § 4(b)’s
preclearance coverage formula in Shelby County, it effectively
released all the jurisdictions that had been subject to the § 5
preclearance regime and prevented any additional localities from
being brought under § 5.35
the Act’s protections. Congress added a requirement for bilingual election
procedures in 1975. See Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a (2012)) (requiring that voting materials be
available in languages other than English in certain communities with high
populations of non-English speakers). In 1984, it adopted provisions to ensure
accessible voting facilities and procedures for persons with disabilities. See Pub.
L. No. 98-435, 98 Stat. 1678 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee
to 1973ee-6 (2012)) (requiring handicapped-accessible voting facilities and
procedures). Sections 3(a) and 8 of the Act authorize the appointment of federal
election observers in certain jurisdictions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a) (2012)
(permitting the appointment of federal election observers); id. § 1973f (same);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 316 (1966) (outlining the structure
of the Voting Rights Act and highlighting § 8’s provision for appointing federal
poll watchers).
31. Statutes Enforced by the Voting Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/overview.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2014)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. See Ilya Shapiro, Shelby County v. Holder: Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act Conflicts with Section 2, Which Provides the Proper Remedy for
Racial Discrimination in Voting, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 14, 2013, 12:20 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-county-v-holder-section-5-of-thevoting-rights-act-conflicts-with-section-2-which-provides-the-proper-remedy-forracial-discrimination-in-voting/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (recognizing that § 2
provides for a private right of action) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Statutes Enforced by the Voting Section, supra note 31 (listing § 2
among the sections of the VRA enforced by the Department of Justice).
33. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down
the coverage formula in § 4(b)).
34. Statutes Enforced by the Voting Section, supra note 31.
35. See Daniel P. Tokaji & Paul Gronke, The Party Line: Shelby County
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B. Section 5 and Its Development in the Supreme Court
When President Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights
Act into law in 1965, he called it “one of the most monumental
laws in the entire history of American freedom.”36 When the
Supreme Court first upheld the Act’s constitutionality in 1966,
Chief Justice Warren wrote that § 5’s preclearance formula was
“rational in both practice and theory.”37 By 2009, however, the
opinion of the Court was that preclearance “raises serious
constitutional questions.”38 And in 2013, when the Court finally
struck down the coverage formula that triggered § 5 preclearance,
Chief Justice Roberts described § 5 preclearance as
“extraordinary and unprecedented.”39
The question for voting-rights enforcement after Shelby
County is how to tailor a preclearance regime that will be broad
enough and strong enough to meaningfully prevent
disenfranchisement but narrow enough to survive scrutiny from a
skeptical Supreme Court.40 A close examination of the cases that
led to Shelby County—and the rationale of the decision itself—
reveals why § 3(c) preclearance just may be the tool that votingrights advocates need.41

and Beyond, 12 ELECTION L.J. 241, 241 (2013) (stating that Shelby County
“nullified the Section 5 preclearance regime”).
36. Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of
the Voting Rights Act, 1965 PUB. PAPERS 840, 841 (Aug. 6, 1965).
37. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966).
38. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S.
193, 204 (2009).
39. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013).
40. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Devising a Sensible Trigger for Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, 12 ELECTION L.J. 332, 334–37 (2013) (proposing a new § 5
coverage formula); Cain, supra note 20, at 338 (saying “the voting rights
discussion has shifted to whether and how Section 5 can be replaced”).
41. See Michael Ellement, Preclearance Without Statutory Change: Bail-In
Suits Post-Shelby County, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA (Sept. 7, 2013, 11:45
AM), http://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/preclearance-without-statutory-change-bailsuits-post-shelby-county (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (arguing that § 3(c)
“satisfies the constitutional requirements laid out by the Shelby County Court”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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1. Katzenbach to Lopez: Upholding § 5

South Carolina filed the first challenge to § 5 on September
29, 1965,42 less than sixty days after President Johnson had
signed the Voting Rights Act into law.43 Twenty-six states
weighed in as amicus curiae: five on the side of South Carolina,
twenty-one supporting the Attorney General and the
constitutionality of the Act.44 After two days of argument in
January 1966, Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the
Court: § 5 and the other challenged provisions were “an
appropriate means for carrying out Congress’[s] constitutional
responsibilities and [were] consonant with all other provisions of
the Constitution.”45
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the
history of voting discrimination46 that post-dated enactment of
the Fifteenth Amendment.47 It emphasized the futility of other
forms of enforcement48 and the “onerous” burden of attacking
discriminatory practices on a case-by-case basis.49 Looking at
federal review of new voting procedures, the Court recognized
that many states were “contriving new rules of various kinds for
the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination.”50
Preventing such rules from taking effect, instead of fighting them
after the fact, was a “permissibly decisive manner” by which
Congress could enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.51 The Court
42. See Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint, and Brief of
Petitioner, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (No. 22, Original)
(giving the filing date as Sept. 29, 1965).
43. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)) (giving an effective date of Aug. 6, 1965).
44. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 n.2 (listing the
States that submitted amicus briefs and on which side they were submitted).
45. Id. at 308.
46. See id. (“The constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
must be judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects.”).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
48. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308–15 (summarizing the history of
enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment that had been compiled by Congress).
49. See id. at 314 (noting that some voting suits required “as many as 6,000
man-hours” to compile the necessary data).
50. Id. at 335.
51. Id.
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also emphasized that if a covered state could show that it had not
used an impermissible “test or device” in the preceding five years,
it would be released from coverage under § 5.52 This temporal
limit, in the eyes of the Court, was a cure for “the possibility of
overbreadth” in application of § 5 coverage.53
Despite the ruling in Katzenbach, States maintained their
challenges to § 5’s continued application.54 The Supreme Court
heard challenges after the Voting Rights Act was amended in
1970 and 1975, and it upheld § 5 in both instances.55 Both sets of
amendments extended the duration of § 5’s preclearance
provisions, for five years in 197056 and for seven in 1975.57 Even
as the Court developed a more stringent standard for finding a
violation of the Fourteenth58 or Fifteenth Amendment,59 § 5
preclearance remained intact.
When Congress renewed the Voting Rights Act in 1982, it
extended § 5’s coverage for the next twenty-five years.60 Congress
extended the coverage because of a lengthy record of findings that
indicated covered jurisdictions were continuing to propose voting
regulations to which the Department of Justice objected and—
even worse—many covered jurisdictions were not complying with

52. See id. at 331–32 (discussing how jurisdictions could terminate § 5
coverage).
53. Id.
54. See Crum, supra note 16, at 2001 (discussing the litigation history of
§ 5 reauthorizations).
55. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 180 (1980) (upholding
§ 5 after the 1975 amendments); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 533
(1973) (upholding § 5 after the 1970 amendments).
56. See Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 4, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970) (amending the
coverage formula to extend an additional five years) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (2012)).
57. See Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 101, 89 Stat. 400, 400 (1975) (amending the
coverage formula to extend an additional seven years) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (2012)).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
59. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(requiring discriminatory intent to establish a Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment violation).
60. See Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(6), 96 Stat. 131, 133 (1982) (setting the
coverage formula to expire after twenty-five years) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c (2012)).
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the strictures of § 5.61 With each renewal and amendment,
Congress stretched § 5’s temporal limit, one of the rationales the
Warren Court had used to uphold § 5 in Katzenbach.62
As late as 1999, the Court was continuing to uphold § 5
preclearance.63 In Lopez v. Monterey County,64 the Court enforced
§ 5 against a covered county (Monterey County) in a state that
itself was not covered (California), even though the change at
issue—a state law consolidating Monterey County’s judicial
districts65—was made at the state level and not by the county
itself.66 The Court in Lopez explicitly recognized that “the Voting
Rights Act, by its nature, intrudes on state sovereignty,” but
found that intrusion permissible under the Fifteenth
Amendment.67
2. NAMUDNO: Questioning § 5
After the 1982 amendments, the temporary provisions of the
Voting Rights Act, including § 5, were due to expire in 2007.68 In
2006, following extensive hearings and testimony,69 Congress
again extended the preclearance formula for another twenty-five
years.70
61. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 9–14 (1982) (noting the frequency of
objections and listing those jurisdictions that had failed to comply with § 5).
62. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331–32 (1966)
(discussing the “termination procedures” that would end preclearance within a
set period of years).
63. See Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 284–85 (1999) (upholding
§ 5 preclearance).
64. 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
65. See id. at 271–75 (describing the series of consolidation ordinances that
led to the instant litigation).
66. See id. at 283 (ruling that even though California was not a covered
state, Monterey County had to comply with § 5’s preclearance requirements).
67. Id. at 284–85.
68. See Rick Lyman, Extension of Voting Rights Act Is Likely Despite
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at A14 (discussing congressional debate
over renewing the Voting Rights Act).
69. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2635–36 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (discussing the legislative history of the 2006 renewal and how
congressional committees “held 21 hearings” and “heard from scores of
witnesses”).
70. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting
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But when a small utility district outside Austin, Texas,
applied for bailout from § 571 and appealed the denial of its
the
Supreme
Court
expressed
“serious
application,72
constitutional concerns” regarding § 5’s validity.73 The Court in
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder (NAMUDNO)74 did not shy away from Katzenbach’s
recognition of the initial need for the Voting Rights Act and § 5 in
particular.75 It did not say that previous rulings upholding § 5
had been made in error, and it recognized that discriminatory
conditions denying the franchise had existed after the Voting
Rights Act’s enactment.76 Nor did the Court deny that the Voting
Rights Act had been successful in preventing many of the
conditions that existed before it came into law.77
Instead, the Court in NAMUDNO focused on two aspects of
§ 5 that it saw as problematic: first, that it treated sister states
with different levels of sovereignty,78 and second, that the data on
which preclearance coverage was determined was more than
thirty-five years old.79 The Court recognized the principle of equal
sovereignty among the states and suggested that because § 5
subjected some states to federal preclearance but not others, § 5
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246,
§ 4, 120 Stat. 577, 580 (replacing the 1982 amendments with the 2006
amendments to extend § 5 preclearance for an additional twenty-five years)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2012)).
71. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557
U.S. 193, 200–01 (2009) (detailing the litigation history that led to the case
before the Court).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 204.
74. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
75. See id. at 197–200 (acknowledging that pre-Voting Rights Act
enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment “can only be regarded as a failure”).
76. See id. at 199–200 (recognizing that “exceptional conditions” existed
when Congress first passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
77. See id. at 201–02 (“The historic accomplishments of the Voting Rights
Act are undeniable.”).
78. See id. at 203 (criticizing the Voting Rights Act because it
“differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the
States enjoy equal sovereignty”).
79. See id. (“The statute’s coverage formula is based on data that is now
more than 35 years old, and there is considerable evidence that it fails to
account for current political conditions.”).
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ran afoul of equal sovereignty.80 The Court also questioned the
weight and validity of the evidence Congress had amassed in
renewing § 5 in 2006.81 Ultimately, however, the Court avoided
the constitutional issue by resolving the issue as a matter of
statutory interpretation. The Court found that the covered
jurisdiction was eligible for bailout—a statutory procedure by
which a jurisdiction covered under § 4(b) could escape
preclearance through a declaratory judgment by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.82 Justice
Thomas, the lone dissenter, argued that the Court should not
avoid the constitutional question of whether § 5 preclearance
violated the Constitution because of how strongly § 5 intruded on
state sovereignty and said he would strike down § 5.83
While the Court avoided the constitutional question and left
§ 5 intact, NAMUDNO sparked a flurry of debate about whether
§ 5 could survive if brought before the Court again.84 Many saw
the ruling as an invitation to Congress to revise the coverage
formula—or viewed another way, as a threat to strike down § 5 if
Congress did not revise it.85 Less than one year later, on April 27,
80. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of
disparate treatment among states). The Court in NAMUDNO cited Katzenbach
as supporting its view that § 5 raised equal sovereignty concerns, 557 U.S. 193,
204 (2009), but the Court in Katzenbach explicitly rejected that argument on the
grounds that the doctrine only applied to “the terms upon which States are
admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have
subsequently appeared.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29
(1966).
81. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557
U.S. 193, 203–04 (2009) (pointing out factual differences between 1965 and 2006
that were included in Congress’s hearings before the 2006 reauthorization).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (2012) (detailing the bailout procedure);
Christopher Seaman, An Uncertain Future for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act:
The Need for a Revised Bailout System, 30 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 9, 26–29
(2010) (describing bailout after the 1982 amendments to the VRA); infra notes
179–89 (discussing the provisions of § 4 bailout).
83. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 212 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that
he would reach the constitutional question because there was no way to award
the full relief sought without doing so).
84. See, e.g., Seaman, supra note 82, at 44–54 (discussing possible
aftermath of the Court’s ruling in NAMUDNO); Crum, supra note 16, at 2010
(discussing § 3(c) preclearance as a substitute or replacement for § 5 after
NAMUDNO).
85. See, e.g., Seaman, supra note 82, at 49 (“Ultimately, NAMUDNO issued
a clear invitation to Congress to address Section 5’s coverage or risk it would be
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2010, Shelby County, Alabama, filed its bailout paperwork86 and
set in motion litigation that led to the end of forty years of § 5
preclearance.
3. Shelby County: Abrogating § 5
When the Court granted certiorari to hear Shelby County
only three years after deciding NAMUDNO, it signaled that it
was ready to decide the constitutionality of the scope and
requirement of preclearance.87 When the decision came down in
June, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court striking down
the coverage formula was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito.88 Justice Thomas wrote a separate
concurrence arguing as he did in NAMUDNO that he would go
further and strike down § 5, not just the coverage formula in
§ 4(b).89
The Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court echoed
NAMUDNO.90 In fact, the entire opinion in Shelby County is cast
in terms of two “basic principles”91 quoted from NAMUDNO: “the
held unconstitutional the next time the issue came before the Court.”).
86. See Complaint at 1, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.D.C.
2011) (No. 10-0651) (requesting a declaratory judgment that § 5 is
unconstitutional).
87. See Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Voting Rights Law, DNA Case
(FINAL UPDATE), SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 9, 2012, 3:11 PM), http://www.scotus
blog.com/2012/11/court-to-rule-on-voting-rights-law-2 (last visited Sept. 24,
2014) (discussing the continuing controversy surrounding § 5 in the wake of
NAMUDNO) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Amy Howe,
Court to Return to Constitutionality of Voting Rights Act: In Plain English,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 25, 2013, 2:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/
02/court-to-return-to-constitutionality-of-voting-rights-act-in-plain-english (last
visited Sept. 24, 2014) (suggesting that “several Justices may be poised to strike
down Section 5”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
88. Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
89. See id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that any preclearance
regime violates principles of federalism and would be unconstitutional).
90. See Jeffrey Harris, The Court Meant What It Said in Northwest Austin,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 5:47 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/thecourt-meant-what-it-said-in-northwest-austin (last visited Sept. 24, 2014)
(counting more than thirty citations to NAMUDNO in Shelby County and noting
the similarity between the two decisions) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
91. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013).
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[Voting Rights] Act imposes current burdens and must be
justified by current needs;”92 and “a departure from the
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing
that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently
related to the problem that it targets.”93 The Court never
established what an acceptable coverage formula would look like,
but did establish that § 4(b) had to fail because it applied too
broadly, without differentiating for local conditions.94 The Court
also noted that § 4(b) did not do enough to reflect conditions in
the here and now.95
The reaction to the opinion, both from supporters of the
Voting Rights Act’s preclearance regime and its opponents, was
strong and swift. Congressman John Lewis, a Civil Rights leader
who led the march from Selma, Alabama in March 196596 that
spurred passage of the Voting Rights Act just months later,97
called the decision “a dagger in the very heart of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.”98 States that had been subject to
preclearance leapt at the chance to implement voting changes
without federal oversight.99 For legal analysts and voting-rights
advocates, focus immediately turned to the implications of the

92. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S.
193, 203 (2009).
93. Id.
94. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (criticizing § 5 coverage for
imposing a uniform standard, irrespective of conditions in covered states).
95. See id. at 2629 (saying Congress reauthorized § 5 coverage “based on
40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day”).
96. Biography, CONGRESSMAN JOHN LEWIS, http://johnlewis.house.gov/johnlewis/biography (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
97. See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 30, at 516 (discussing
how the violence displayed in Selma spurred passage of the Voting Rights Act in
1965).
98. Jeff Zeleny, John Lewis: Court’s Decision Puts ‘Dagger in Heart of
(Jun.
25, 2013,
12:16 PM),
Voting
Rights
Act,’
ABC NEWS
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/06/courts-decision-puts-dagger-inheart-of-voting-rights-act/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
99. See Associated Press, supra note 14 (identifying states that proposed
new voting-related changes after Shelby County).
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Voting Rights Act without § 5 preclearance.100 One of the places
they turned was to the VRA itself and § 3(c).101
III. The Pocket Trigger of § 3(c)
While § 2 of the VRA lays out the promise of equal voting
rights, it is a promise without punch. Section 2 does not by itself
explicitly provide for any remedy if a locality violates its terms.102
Sections 3, 4, and 5 were written as the statutory muscle.103 With
the striking down of § 4 leading to a “toothless” § 5,104 the only
meaningful remedy that remains for preempting discriminatory
voting procedures is § 3, specifically § 3(c).105
Section 3(c) works by allowing a federal district court where
a voting-rights suit is brought to retain jurisdiction over a
violating locality.106 The court must find both that the locality’s
100. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Opinion Recap: Voting Law in Deep Peril,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 12:42 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/
opinion-recap-voting-law-in-deep-peril/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (saying
Shelby County “struck down a key part of the . . . Voting Rights Act”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Richard Pildes, Shelby
Commentary: What Does the Court’s Decision Mean?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25,
2013, 1:47 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/ shelby-commentary-whatdoes-the-courts-decision-mean/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (questioning the
future of federal voting-rights enforcement without the tool of § 5 preclearance)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
101. See Cain, supra note 20 (saying § 3(c) is one immediate substitute for
§ 5 preclearance).
102. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315–16 (1966)
(describing the “stringent remedies” of §§ 4 and 5 as “[t]he heart of the [Voting
Rights] Act”). Courts have found implied rights of action to sue to enforce § 2.
See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (finding an implied right of
action for citizens suing on the basis of § 2).
103. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315–16 (describing § 3 as “strengthen[ing]
existing procedures for attacking voting discrimination by means of litigation”).
104. See Anna Fifield, Supreme Court Strikes Down Key Part of Voting
Rights Act, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2013, 5:25 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/
0/f6da3170-dd9d-11e2-892b-00144feab7de.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014)
(describing § 5 without § 4(b) as “toothless”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
105. See Ellement, supra note 41 (describing § 3(c) preclearance as “the
remedial option closest to the previously utilized § 5 preclearance structure”).
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012) (authorizing a federal district court to
retain jurisdiction over a defendant locality that has enacted voting procedures
in violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment); Crum, supra note 16,

2130

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2115 (2014)

voting procedures violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment107—which in turn requires finding that the
procedure has both discriminatory effects and was enacted with
the intent to discriminate108—and additionally that the violation
“justif[ies] equitable relief.”109 Once the court makes that finding,
it can require the locality to submit any subsequent voting
changes to the court for approval.110 No changes can take effect
without the court’s sign-off for a period of time set down by the
court.111 The approval process can also go through the
Department of Justice. If the locality submits its changes to the
Attorney General and the Attorney General makes no objections
within sixty days, the change can take effect.112
Section 3(c) has been part of the Voting Rights Act since its
initial enactment in 1965.113 The only major change in its
provisions came in 1975, adding language to clarify that § 3(c)
would apply to violations of either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment114 and permitting suits by persons other than the
Attorney General.115

at 2009 (describing the mechanics of § 3(c)).
107. See Crum, supra note 16, at 2009 (explaining the discriminatory intent
requirement in § 3(c)’s trigger).
108. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (noting that “action
by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment
only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose”); Crum, supra note 16, at 2009
(discussing City of Mobile v. Bolden and its implications for § 3(c)).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012).
110. See id. (barring the implementation of new voting procedures “unless
and until” the Court finds that the new procedures have neither discriminatory
purpose nor effect).
111. See id. (permitting the court to retain jurisdiction for “such period as it
may deem appropriate”).
112. See id. (providing for intervention by the Attorney General).
113. Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 3(c), 79 Stat. 437, 437–38 (1965).
114. See Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 205, 89 Stat. 400, 402 (1975) (striking out
“fifteenth amendment” and substituting “fourteenth or fifteenth amendment”).
115. See Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 401, 89 Stat. 400, 404 (1975) (allowing suits by
the Attorney General or “an aggrieved person”).
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A. Section 3(c)’s Constitutionality Before Shelby County
The Supreme Court detailed the standard to which
legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment must conform in
City of Boerne v. Flores.116 For legislative schemes designed to
remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, “[t]here must
be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”117
Preclearance—or at least § 5 preclearance—is such a remedial
legislative scheme.118 The Court cited Boerne in NAMUDNO,
quoting its earlier language that “[s]trong measures appropriate
to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another,
lesser one.”119 In fact the Boerne standard was one of the reasons
the Court thought § 5’s “preclearance requirements and its
coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions.”120 The
“extraordinary” nature of § 5 preclearance, predicated on a
statutory violation only, gave the Court pause in NAMUDNO121
and proved fatal to the coverage formula in Shelby County.122
The current structure of § 3(c) likely survives scrutiny under
the Boerne standard.123 While the preclearance remedy may be
extraordinary in the eyes of the Court, it is congruent when
targeted at a specific bad-actor jurisdiction for actions taken in
close temporal proximity to the time of litigation.124 It is also a
116. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
117. Id. at 520.
118. See id. at 518–19 (discussing the history of the VRA in the Court’s
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966), and City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980))).
119. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S.
193, 225–26 (2009) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997)).
120. Id. at 204.
121. Id. at 224 (quoting Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491,
500–01 (1992), and United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 141
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting), both of which describe § 5 preclearance as
“extraordinary”).
122. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (quoting the
same passage from Presley regarding the “extraordinary” nature of § 5 as
NAMUDNO).
123. See Crum, supra note 16, at 2021–27 (analyzing § 3(c) under a threestep Boerne analysis and concluding that it “stands a good chance of surviving
constitutional scrutiny”).
124. See id. (emphasizing that § 3(c) preclearance is imposed close in time to
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proportional remedy given that the plaintiff has to clear the high
bar of proving intentional discrimination—it requires proof of a
constitutional violation, not just a statutory one.125 But while
§ 3(c) likely survives the Court’s analysis under Boerne, will it
survive under Shelby County?
B. Section 3(c)’s Constitutionality After Shelby County
In many ways, § 3(c) preclearance resembles the § 5
preclearance regime that was in place for more than forty years126
and that the Court invalidated in Shelby County.127 Both permit
federal oversight of state and local election procedure.128 Both
have mechanisms by which either the Department of Justice or
the federal judiciary can authorize a covered jurisdiction to
implement a change to its voting procedure.129 And both require
the approving entity to look at the purpose and the effect of the
proposed change.130
But § 3(c) is much more targeted than its now-defunct
statutory cousin.131 While § 5 applied to any jurisdiction that met
a predetermined list of criteria articulated in § 4(b), § 3(c) only
applies to a specific jurisdiction after specific conditions have
been found.132 The relevant court for § 5 preclearance was, in all
cases, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.133 Section 3(c) puts the preclearance regime closer to
proven violations).
125. See id. (discussing why § 3(c) is a proportional response).
126. See id. at 2008–09 (comparing § 5 preclearance and § 3(c) preclearance).
127. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (striking down the coverage
formula).
128. See Crum, supra note 16, at 2008–09 (comparing § 5 preclearance and
§ 3(c) preclearance).
129. See id. (comparing § 5 preclearance and § 3(c) preclearance).
130. See id. (comparing § 5 preclearance and § 3(c) preclearance).
131. See id. at 2016 (describing how § 3(c) is more targeted than § 5).
132. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012) (relying on the coverage formula of
§ 4(b)), with id. § 1973a(c) (covering only the specific jurisdiction being sued).
133. See id. at § 1973c (reserving the power to issue declaratory judgments
approving voting procedure changes to the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia); Crum, supra note 16, at 2008–09 (describing the bailout
and preclearance provisions of § 5).
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the covered locality: the court overseeing the locality’s changes
will be the federal district court with proper jurisdiction and
venue for the initial lawsuit.134
While Shelby County was an alarm bell for traditional Voting
Rights Act enforcement through the § 5 framework,135 the
rationale of the opinion points toward favoring a more limited
approach like § 3(c).136 The Court only struck down § 4(b)’s
coverage formula.137 It did not go as far as Justice Thomas urged
and strike down § 5’s very concept of preclearance.138 By focusing
narrowly on the data used to justify preclearance, the Court
seems to have accepted that preclearance can work as a
constitutional remedy for unconstitutional state-election
changes—just not as it was implemented by § 4(b).139 Because
§ 3(c) requires evidence specific to a locality and sufficient to clear
the high bar of proving discriminatory purpose, § 3(c)
preclearance is more narrowly tailored.140 By proving a case
sufficient to justify § 3(c) relief, a plaintiff will demonstrate
“current needs” sufficient to justify the “current burdens” of § 3(c)
preclearance.141

134. See Crum, supra note 16, at 2009 (“In pocket trigger litigation,
however, the local district court retains jurisdiction and can receive
preclearance requests.”).
135. See Tokaji & Gronke, supra note 35, at 241 (calling Shelby County “the
end of an era in which barriers to racial minorities’ participation and
representation were substantially weakened, if not entirely shattered”).
136. See Cain, supra note 20, at 340 (suggesting that expanding use of § 3(c)
preclearance is one of the better tactics for voting-rights enforcement in the
absence of legislative action).
137. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (“We issue no
holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage formula.”).
138. See id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the rationale of
the Court’s opinion should have led it to strike down § 5).
139. See id. at 2631 (majority opinion) (“Congress may draft another
[coverage] formula based on current conditions.”).
140. See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text (comparing § 3(c)
preclearance with § 5 preclearance).
141. See Crum, supra note 16, at 2021–36 (analyzing § 3(c) preclearance in a
post-NAMUDNO, pre-Shelby County framework).
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IV. Section 3(c) Implementation in a Post-Shelby County World
Section 3(c) to this point has been implemented primarily
through acquiescence of the challenged locality.142 In the nearly
fifty intervening years since enactment of the Voting Rights Act,
eighteen jurisdictions have been brought under § 3(c)’s
purview.143 More than half of those jurisdictions entered into
consent decrees with the federal government.144 Even the State of
Arkansas, one of the jurisdictions that fully litigated its case
before coming under § 3(c), withdrew its appeal to the Supreme
Court145 and has complied with the preclearance order.146
But voting procedures have become a political hot button,
and settlement between states and local jurisdictions on one
hand, and the federal government on the other, may no longer be
politically tenable. For example, in both 2011 and 2012, more
than thirty states considered legislation related to voter ID
142. See id. at 2015–16 (emphasizing the use of consent decrees in § 3(c)
implementation).
143. See Statement of Interest of the United States with Respect to § 3(c) of
the Voting Rights Act, at 3, Perez v. Texas, No. 11-cv-360 (W.D. Tex. July 25,
2013) (saying there has been “coverage of two states . . . as well as twelve
counties, two cities, and two school districts”).
144. See LETTER OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN CIBOLA COUNTY, NEW MEXICO AND
THE UNITED STATES at 2 (2011) (acknowledging that Cibola County, New Mexico
had “been under some form of ‘Consent Decree’ and federal court jurisdiction”
since 1994); Order Granting Joint Motion for Entry of Limited Consent Decree
at 14, United States v. Sandoval Cnty., N.M., No. 88-cv-1457 (D.N.M. July 6,
2011) (retaining jurisdiction over Sandoval County, New Mexico); Consent
Decree at 5–6, United States v. Village of Port Chester, No. 06-cv-15173
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2009) (imposing preclearance over the Village of Port Chester,
N.Y., for a period ending June 22, 2016, or after “three election cycles,
whichever is longer”); Crum, supra note 16, at 2010–11 (identifying consent
decrees establishing preclearance over New Mexico; Chattanooga, Tennessee;
Los Angeles County, California; Thurston County, Nebraska; Bernalillo County,
New Mexico; and Buffalo and Charles Mix Counties, South Dakota).
145. See Clinton v. Jeffers, 498 U.S. 1129, 1129 (1991) (acknowledging
Arkansas’s withdrawal of its appeal).
146. See Jeffers v. Tucker, 847 F. Supp. 655, 656–57 (E.D. Ark. 1994)
(reporting that the Arkansas Board of Apportionment had submitted its post1990 redistricting plan to the court and that the plan had been approved);
Notice of Preclearance Activity Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, As
Amended, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/notices/
vnote011802.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (listing two submissions from
Arkansas to the Department of Justice for preclearance review) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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requirements.147 In states where the requirements became
stricter, proponents cited the specter of voter fraud as their prime
motivator.148 Parties opposing those changes have alleged that
the new laws are invidious forms of voter suppression, motivated
by partisan electoral aims and targeting poor and minority
voters.149 Attorney General Eric Holder went so far as to call the
voter ID laws “poll taxes” because of the costs associated with
obtaining photo ID that would satisfy new requirements.150 The
rhetoric from states facing challenges to their post-Shelby County
voting changes is no less fiery. Governor Pat McCrory of North
Carolina called the Department of Justice’s lawsuit in that state
“an overreach and without merit.”151 Texas Governor Rick Perry
went even further, charging that the Justice Department’s suit in
the Lone Star State was designed to “obstruct the will of the
people of Texas” and pledging to “continue to defend the integrity
of our elections against [the Obama] administration’s blatant
disregard for the 10th Amendment.”152 If jurisdictions fight § 3(c)
147. Voter Identification Requirements, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.
aspx [hereinafter Voter Identification Requirements] (last visited Sept. 24, 2014)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. See Ethan Bronner, Legal Battles Erupt as Voters Fear Exclusion by
Tough ID Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2012, at A1 (saying strict voter ID
advocates are concerned with “ensuring the integrity of elections” and
“preventing voter fraud”). Voter impersonation, the kind of voter fraud that
voter ID laws seek to prevent, is exceedingly rare. See Amy Bingham, Voter
Fraud: Non-Existent Problem or Election-Threatening Epidemic?, ABC NEWS
(Sept. 12, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/voter-fraud-real-rare/
story?id=17213376 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (reporting that of 197 million
votes cast in federal elections between 2002 and 2005, only 26 voters—or
.00000013 percent—pled guilty to or were convicted of voter fraud) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
149. See Bronner, supra note 148, at A1 (noting that Democrats called
proposed voter ID changes “voter suppression”). Those allegations gained
credence when a Republican legislator in Pennsylvania said that the
commonwealth’s new voter ID laws would “allow Governor Romney to win the
state of Pennsylvania.” Id.
150. See id. (describing Holder’s comments).
151. McCrory: Feds ‘Overreach’ in Voter Law Challenge, WRAL (Sept. 30,
2013), http://www.wral.com/government-sues-nc-over-voter-law/12939343 (last
updated Oct. 1, 2013) (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
152. Rob Snyder, Texas Officials React to New Lawsuit Filed by Department
of Justice Against State of Texas Concerning Voter ID, KFYO (Aug. 22, 2013),
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preclearance tooth and nail, the suits lose the benefits of
implementation through consent decree.153
Implementing an effective bail-in regime based on § 3(c)
through adverse, politically charged litigation puts a premium on
understanding the law’s mechanics. This Part addresses three
major considerations for § 3(c) after Shelby County: an
evidentiary presumption that courts should implement for
plaintiffs seeking § 3(c) relief;154 a proposed new mechanism for
the duration of § 3(c) preclearance regimes;155 and the
appropriate standard of appellate review for such a regime.156
Taken together, these proposals should make § 3(c) coverage
easier to obtain, more robust once in place, and more difficult to
challenge on appeal.
A. Presuming Purpose
Proving discriminatory purpose is necessary to prove a
violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment and possibly
trigger § 3(c).157 Unfortunately for voting-rights advocates,
proving discriminatory purpose is also very hard and can be
exorbitantly expensive.158
Under the language of § 3(c), that high bar of discriminatory
purpose re-enters the equation even after the threshold finding
triggering coverage. The court that retains jurisdiction disallows
http://www.kfyo.com/texas-officials-react-to-new-lawsuit-filed-by-department-ofjustice-against-state-of-texas-concerning-voter-id (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
153. See Crum, supra note 16, at 2016 (“[B]ecause a jurisdiction waives the
right to appeal, consent decrees end litigation and insulate section 3 suits from
appellate review.”).
154. Infra Part IV.A.
155. Infra Part IV.B.
156. Infra Part IV.C.
157. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65–67 (1980) (requiring
discriminatory purpose for a Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment violation);
Crum, supra note 16, at 2009 (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden as requiring
intentional discrimination to trigger § 3(c)).
158. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting
Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 736 (1998)
(citing reports that the plaintiffs in Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050
(S.D. Ala. 1982), incurred $96,000 in attorneys’ fees).
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changes “unless and until” it finds that the proposed change “does
not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”159 This
language can and should be construed as creating a presumption
against the covered jurisdiction. The language of § 3(c) mirrors
that of § 5, which permits a covered jurisdiction to seek a
declaratory judgment that its proposed voting change “does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect” of discriminating
on the basis of race.160 Shelby County may have invalidated the
provision that gave § 5 any enforcement teeth, but it left the
language and logic of § 5 intact.161 Interpreting that identical
language more than thirty years before, the Court established
that the jurisdiction “bears the burden of proving lack of
discriminatory purpose and effect.”162
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in City of Rome v.
United States163 made the rationale for such a presumption
crystal clear: “Congress could rationally have concluded that,
because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the
risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit
changes that have a discriminatory impact.”164 The evidence that
demonstrates that “history of intentional racial discrimination in
voting” is more closely tied to a § 3(c) jurisdiction because a court
has to make an individualized finding to trigger coverage,
whereas a § 5 jurisdiction was covered simply if it fell under the
broad § 4(b) coverage formula.165 But whatever the evidence, once
a plaintiff satisfies the high bar of City of Mobile v. Bolden166 and

159. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
160. Id. § 1973c.
161. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (“We issue no
holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage formula.”).
162. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 n.18 (1980) (emphasis
added) (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140–41 (1976), Georgia v.
United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973), and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 335 (1966)).
163. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
164. Id. at 177 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
165. See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text (describing how § 3(c) is
more targeted than § 5).
166. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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proves discriminatory purpose, City of Rome says the case does
not have to be proved again and again.167
B. Duration of Preclearance
Once a jurisdiction is bailed into § 3(c), the next question is
how long the jurisdiction is subject to the court’s supervision. The
statutory language is silent on a ceiling for duration, stating only
that it is limited to “such period as [the court] may deem
appropriate.”168 Conceivably, this would allow a court to continue
supervising and disallowing state procedural changes for as long
as there is a court.169 But part of what motivated the Supreme
Court to strike down the preclearance formula of § 4(b) was its
reliance on “decades-old data and eradicated practices.”170 The
logical implication that follows is that a rational date for
terminating a jurisdiction’s § 3(c) preclearance regime is crucial
to keeping that regime within constitutional bounds.171
Because most § 3(c) regimes have been implemented by
consent decree, the parties have been able to negotiate a time
period, yielding benefits to both sides.172 The flexibility of the
consent-decree approach is reflected in the variety of the terms:
the City of Chattanooga settled on the Eastern District of
Tennessee retaining jurisdiction only over the next municipal
redistricting plan;173 Thurston County, Nebraska, agreed to a
five-year plan;174 Buffalo County, South Dakota, and the State of
167. See 446 U.S. at 183 n.18 (putting the burden of proving lack of
discriminatory purpose and effect on the covered jurisdiction).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012).
169. See Crum, supra note 16, at 2009 (noting that “the pocket trigger is
permanent” once imposed).
170. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627 (2013).
171. See Crum, supra note 16, at 2024 (analyzing § 3(c) in the context of City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No.
One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193 (2009), both of which were central to
the Court’s analysis in Shelby County).
172. See id. at 2016 (identifying numerous benefits to settlement of
litigation through § 3(c) consent decrees).
173. See Brown v. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. C-1-87-388, slip op. ¶¶ 19–20 (E.D.
Tenn. Jan. 11, 1990) (consenting to the court retaining jurisdiction over the next
municipal redistricting plan).
174. See United States v. Thurston Cnty., No. 78-0-380, slip op. at 3 (D. Neb.
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New Mexico both consented to ten-year plans;175 and Charles Mix
County, South Dakota, agreed to a twenty-year plan.176 The State
of Arkansas—the only jurisdiction to have appealed the
imposition of § 3(c) preclearance to the Supreme Court, albeit
only briefly—faced the longest and most indefinite term of any of
the § 3(c) jurisdictions: “until further order of” the issuing
court.”177
Because § 3(c)’s language mirrors the preclearance language
of § 5,178 the provisions for terminating § 5 preclearance provide
some useful guidance on how and when to terminate § 3(c)
preclearance. Section 4, which provided the statutory trigger for
§ 5,179 also provided an escape clause—the so-called “bailout”
provision.180 If a jurisdiction wanted to get out from under § 5
preclearance, it could apply for a declaratory judgment in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia that
would terminate § 5 coverage.181 The declaratory judgment,
however, could only issue after a series of findings about voting
procedures in the locality over the past ten years.182 These
findings include first, that the locality had not used any “test or
device . . . for the purpose or with the effect” of voting

May 9, 1979) (consenting to the court retaining jurisdiction for a five-year
period).
175. See Kirkie v. Buffalo Cnty., No. 03-CV-3011, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30960, at *7 (D.S.D. Feb. 12, 2004) (consenting to a ten-year period of court
supervision); Sanchez v. Anaya, No. 82-0067M, slip op. ¶ 8 (D.N.M. Dec. 17,
1984) (consenting to ten years of retained jurisdiction).
176. See Blackmoon v. Charles Mix Cnty., No. Civ. 05-4017, slip op. ¶ 2
(D.S.D. Dec. 4, 2007) (consenting to twenty years of preclearance). Charles Mix
County’s preclearance term ended January 1, 2013. Id.
177. Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 627 (E.D. Ark. 1990).
178. Supra note 160.
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2012), invalidated by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (providing the test that brought jurisdictions under the
requirements of § 5); Shelby Cnty. 133 S. Ct. at 2619–20 (describing the
coverage formula).
180. See Seaman, supra note 82, at 18 (describing the bailout procedure).
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2012) (permitting covered entities to apply
for a declaratory judgment); Seaman, supra note 82, at 18 (discussing the
bailout procedure in the original Voting Rights Act of 1965).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2012) (permitting the declaratory judgment
“only if” the court determined the list of factors).
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discrimination;183 that the locality had not been found in other
litigation to have committed a discriminatory voting violation;184
that no federal election examiners had been assigned to the
locality;185 that the locality had not implemented changes without
preclearing them;186 that the Attorney General had not objected
to proposed changes;187 and that the locality had “engaged in
other constructive efforts” to expand ease of voter registration
and participation.188
From the earliest challenges to the Voting Rights Act’s
preclearance provisions, the bailout provision has been an
important rationale for why the Act is constitutionally
permissible.189 Using the structure of § 4(a)—looking backward to
the past ten years—to fashion § 3(c) relief should insulate it from
potential challenges and is the best approach for courts retaining
jurisdiction under § 3(c). Ten years is already the middle of the
range of durations consented to in prior § 3(c) cases.190 A court
that sets ten years as the “period it may deem appropriate”191
would thus be in line with prior practice. Affirmatively imposing
requirements similar to § 4(a) from the outset would give the
court the power to hold bad actors under its jurisdiction for
longer, effectively resetting the clock with each violation of the
terms.
A § 3(c) preclearance order implementing § 4(a)’s structure—
and adopting § 4(a)’s provisions for releasing a covered
jurisdiction—could take the following form:
The Court finds that the voting standards, practices, and
procedures of defendant State were enacted with the
purpose and will have the effect of denying or abridging the

183. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(A).
184. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(B).
185. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(C).
186. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(D).
187. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(E).
188. Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(F).
189. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331–32 (1966)
(recognizing the bailout provision as a remedy for “the possibility of
overbreadth” in the coverage formula).
190. See supra notes 173–77 (describing the terms of § 3(c) preclearance in
previous cases).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012).
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right to vote on account of race or color.192

The Court finds that the voting standards, practices,
and procedures of defendant State violate the Fourteenth
or Fifteenth Amendments and justify equitable relief.193
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c), the Court retains
jurisdiction until such time as defendant State
demonstrates that, in the preceding ten years,194 it has not:
(1) submitted for the Court’s approval any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting that had the purpose
and would have the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
voting guarantees set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2);195
(2) had any final judgment entered against it in any action
alleging that its voting standards, practices, or procedures
have denied or abridged the right to vote on account of race
or color or in contravention of the voting guarantees set
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2), nor entered into any
consent decree, settlement, or agreement terminating such
an action;196
(3) had any Federal examiners or observers assigned to it
under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a);197
(4) implemented any change to its voting standards,
practices, or procedures without first submitting them for
this Court’s approval;198 or
192. Cf. id. (using this language to establish the standard for when § 3(c)
preclearance may be imposed).
193. Cf. id. (requiring both that the practice violates the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendment and that the violation “justify[] equitable relief”).
194. Cf. id. § 1973b(a)(1) (setting ten years as the look-back period for
bailout determinations).
195. Cf. id. § 1973a(c) (providing for proposed changes the court must
disallow).
196. Cf. id. § 1973b(a)(1)(B) (setting out one condition that would result in a
jurisdiction’s bailout petition being denied).
197. Cf. id. § 1973b(a)(1)(C) (providing that a bailout petition would be
denied if federal election examiners or observers had been assigned to the
jurisdiction).
198. Cf. id. § 1973b(a)(1)(D) (requiring jurisdictions seeking bailout to have
complied with § 5 preclearance).
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(5) had any proposed change to its voting standards,
practices, or procedures objected to by the Attorney General
if such objection was sustained by this Court.199

The bailout provision is both a remedy for overinclusiveness200 and an incentive for localities to conduct voting
within the strictures of the Constitution and the Voting Rights
Act.201 Because § 3(c) already requires a finding of discrimination
particular to the locality, the over-inclusiveness problem never
arises.202 But courts implementing § 3(c) can bring the good-actor
incentive of bailout into § 3(c) preclearance by following the
structure of § 4(a).
C. Standard of Appellate Review
Before imposing a § 3(c) preclearance regime, a trial judge
must answer two questions in the affirmative: (1) Has the
challenged jurisdiction violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment; and if so, (2) do those violations “justify[] equitable
relief?”203 Once the regime is imposed, the court is obliged to
continue supervising the jurisdiction’s voting procedures,
rejecting any change to such procedures that has the purpose and
effect of race-based discrimination.204 There are thus three
central decisions on which a party defeated at the trial level may
base its appeal: the initial determination of a constitutional
violation, the court’s determination that the equitable remedy of
retained jurisdiction is appropriate, and each subsequent
determination that a voting change is intentionally
199. Cf. id. § 1973b(a)(1)(E) (preventing bailout for jurisdictions that had
objections interposed by the Attorney General).
200. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331–32 (1966)
(recognizing the bailout provision as a remedy for “the possibility of
overbreadth” in the coverage formula).
201. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 14 (1982) (expressing the view of the Senate
Judiciary Committee that the “revised bailout procedures” would provide an
“added incentive to comply” with the Voting Rights Act).
202. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text (describing how § 3(c) is
more targeted than § 5).
203. See Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 587 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (posing
these two questions as the court lays out its necessary inquiry).
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012) (giving the court power to retain
jurisdiction).
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discriminatory. This Note addresses only the standard of
appellate review for the latter two determinations, as the first is
not unique to § 3(c).205
A court that retains jurisdiction under § 3(c) is exercising its
equity powers.206 Section 3(c) provides that after a finding of
“violations of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment justifying
equitable relief,” the court “shall retain jurisdiction.”207 The
“shall” language implicates the Hecht Co. v. Bowles208 approach
that the word “shall” in a statutory command to a court permits—
but does not require—a court to implement an equitable
remedy.209 Because the decision to retain jurisdiction and
establish a preclearance regime are exercises of the district
court’s equity powers, the proper standard of review by an
appellate court should be the abuse-of-discretion standard by
which other equitable remedies are reviewed.210
The ongoing determination by a court that proposed changes
are discriminatory in purpose and effect is a factual finding and
should stand unless clearly erroneous.211 The Supreme Court has
taken this view in previous reviews of allegedly discriminatory
voting procedures.212
205. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65–67 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (establishing the standard for basic constitutional violations in voting
procedures).
206. See Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 600–01 (analyzing the language of
§ 1973a(c) to measure “whatever relief is granted . . . against traditional
equitable remedial principles”).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
208. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
209. See id. at 328 (noting that “‘shall be granted’ is less mandatory than a
literal reading might suggest”); Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 600–01
(E.D. Ark. 1990) (reading “shall,” in light of Hecht Co. v. Bowles, to be
permissive but not mandatory).
210. See DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL
REMEDIES AND CONTEMPT 442 (2010) (“The court of appeals defers to the trial
judge’s decisions on things like the details of an injunction unless the trial judge
has abused his discretion.” (emphasis added)).
211. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the
reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge
the witnesses’ credibility.”); RENDLEMAN, supra note 210, at 442 (“In the federal
system, the court of appeals will not reject a trial judge’s finding of fact unless it
is clearly erroneous.”).
212. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 (1980) (“We are
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These standards place extraordinary importance on getting
things right at the trial level. The abuse-of-discretion standard
has been described as “capacious,”213 “highly deferential,”214 and
the standard that is “most deferential to trial court decisions.”215
The clearly erroneous standard gives a reviewing court some
additional power compared to the abuse-of-discretion standard,
but it “is still very respectful of the trial court’s factual
determinations.”216 The more deferential the standard, the more
difficult it becomes to overturn the trial court’s decision on
appeal.217
But getting it right at the trial level will not be an easy task.
Under the pre-Shelby County regime, a great deal of the
assessment of voting procedures was done by a small number of
judges because the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia conducted all § 5 preclearance.218 With Shelby County’s
abrogation of the former preclearance regime, that assessment is
left to the federal district court in which the action is brought.219
Whatever expertise may have been concentrated in a single
judicial district is now diluted among the ninety-four federal
judicial districts around the country.220 Understanding the extent
mindful that the District Court’s findings of fact [as to the discriminatory effect
of proposed changes] must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.”).
213. RENDLEMAN, supra note 210, at 442.
214. Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary
Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 50 (2000).
215. Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of
Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 243 (2009).
216. Id. at 245.
217. See Raymond T. Elligett, Jr. & John M. Scheb, Appellate Standards of
Review—How Important Are They?, 70 FLA. BAR J. 33, 34 (1996) (asserting that
“[m]ost practitioners would consider the difficulty in obtaining a reversal as
increasing as the standard moves” toward the more deferential standards).
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012) (reserving bail-out and review functions
under § 5 to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia); Nw.
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 198
(2009) (recognizing that § 5 “suspended all changes in state election procedure
until they were submitted to and approved by a three-judge Federal District
Court in Washington, D.C.”).
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (making no provision for removing § 3(c) suits
to any specific division, district, or circuit of the federal judiciary).
220. See District Courts, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/
UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/DistrictCourts.aspx (last visited Sept. 24,
2014) (identifying the number of federal judicial districts as ninety-four) (on file
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to which a piece of proposed legislation will affect a given
population requires analysis of complex statistical and socialscience studies.221 But the manner in which the Shelby County
majority—and its predecessor in NAMUDNO—approached the
social-science record dismayed a number of Court observers and
voting-rights scholars.222 If the highest Court in the land misread,
failed to consider, or misapplied the quantitative data in Shelby
County, it seems difficult to expect much more from district
courts without experience in voting rights litigation.223
There is one additional peculiarity of voting-rights litigation
that makes the trial-level proceedings especially important for
the vitality of § 3(c). Redistricting cases must be tried in front of a
three-judge district court panel.224 Injunctions issued in an action
that, by statute, must be heard by a three-judge panel may be
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.225 This route was how
Arkansas appealed its § 3(c) preclearance regime before dropping
the appeal.226 Direct appeal to a Court that is already skeptical of
federal courts playing a role in the implementation of state voting
procedures227—and is less beholden to precedent than the circuit
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
221. See Doug Chapin, Voting Rights After Shelby County: Bring On the
Election Geeks, 12 ELECTION L.J. 327, 327 (2013) (“[I]n the post-Shelby
landscape, data—specifically, data about election administration—are more
valuable and more likely to be more influential than ever before.”).
222. See, e.g., David C. Kimball, Judges Are Not Social Scientists (Yet), 12
ELECTION L.J. 324, 324–25 (2013) (“[I]t is jarring how little the majority
opinion . . . mentions any social science evidence. . . . [A] large body of evidence
on race, ethnicity, and voting is excluded from the Court majority’s
analysis . . . .”); Katz, supra note 10, at 331 (“[T]he Court’s dismissal of the
second-generation evidence as off-topic is difficult to fathom.”).
223. See Kimball, supra note 222, at 326 (“There is room in the legal
profession for a better understanding of what social science evidence does and
does not show.”).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2012).
225. Id. § 1253.
226. See Jurisdictional Statement for Petitioners at 1, Clinton v. Jeffers, No.
90-394 (U.S. Aug. 31, 1990) (asserting jurisdiction for direct appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012)).
227. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013) (calling the
Voting Rights Act “an extraordinary departure from the traditional course of
relations between the States and the Federal Government,” and “extraordinary
legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system” (citations and quotations
omitted)).
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courts228—could knock another leg out from under litigants
seeking to enforce the protections of the Voting Rights Act.229
V. The Voting Rights Amendments Act of 2014
Given the universal uproar over the Court’s decision in
Shelby County230—and over the federal government’s consequent
reliance on extant provisions of the VRA231—it is no surprise that
Congress has re-entered the voting-rights fray. On January 16,
2014, Representatives Jim Sensenbrenner and John Conyers
introduced the Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014;232 Senator
Patrick Leahy introduced identical legislation in the Senate.233
The bills will “amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to revise the
criteria for determining which States and political subdivisions
are subject to section 4 of the Act.”234 In plain language, the
Voting Rights Amendment Act (VRAA) rewrites the § 4(b)
coverage formula struck down in Shelby County and revives § 5
preclearance.235
228. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10–13 (1994)
(observing that “the Supreme Court can overrule precedents that it no longer
believes are correctly decided,” while “[i]t is axiomatic that an inferior court
must respect prior precedents created by its superior courts”).
229. See Crum, supra note 16, at 2016 (“[K]eeping [§ 3(c)] cases off the
Supreme Court’s docket for several years may be in civil rights groups’ strategic
interest.”).
230. See supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text (describing reactions to
Shelby County).
231. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text (reporting on the
reactions to federal lawsuits in Texas and North Carolina that are requesting
§ 3(c) relief).
232. H.R. 3899, 113th Congress (2014).
233. See Ari Berman, Members of Congress Introduce a New Fix for the
Voting Rights Act, THE NATION (Jan. 16, 2014, 11:53 AM),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/177962/members-congress-introduce-new-fix-votingrights-act (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (reporting on the legislation’s introduction
and provisions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Voting
Rights Amendment Act of 2014, S. 1945, 113th Congress (2014).
234. H.R. 3899 § 1; S. 1945 § 1.
235. See Berman, supra note 233 (saying the VRAA would “reinstate the
vital protections of the [Voting Rights Act] that the Supreme Court took away”
in Shelby County).
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But on top of setting out a new coverage formula, the VRAA
also changes the trigger for § 3(c) preclearance.236 No longer would
§ 3(c) preclearance be dependent on proving a violation of the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.237 Instead, a voting-rights
plaintiff would be entitled to § 3(c) relief if she could prove a
violation of other provisions of the Voting Rights Act or “any Federal
voting rights law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, or membership in a language minority group.”238 The
constitutional trigger of Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment
violations does not go away, but is instead augmented by statutory
triggers.239
The VRAA puts into legislative language Travis Crum’s
proposal from his 2010 Note on § 3(c) to “decouple section 3 from its
constitutional trigger.”240 But as Crum acknowledged, that
decoupling raises its own questions of constitutionality.241 Removing
the requirement of constitutional injury, as the VRAA does,242 could
make the preclearance remedy disproportionate.243 If a plaintiff
seeking § 3(c) relief does not have to prove the discriminatory intent
of the enacting legislature—as she would to prove a Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendment violation under City of Mobile v. Bolden244—
she does not have to prove the same level of injury or harm.245 The
236. See H.R. 3899 § 2(a) (allowing for § 3(c) to be applied for voting-rights
violations beyond violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
237. See id. (expanding the violations for which § 3(c) can be applied).
238. Id.
239. See id. (retaining “violations of the 14th or 15th Amendment” as
triggers in § 3(c) preclearance).
240. Crum, supra note 16, at 2010.
241. See id. at 2037 (recognizing that his proposed change could “make
section 3 more vulnerable to constitutional attack”).
242. See supra notes 236–39 and accompanying text (outlining the changes
to § 3(c) in the VRAA).
243. See Rick Hasen, Initial Thoughts on the Proposed Amendments to the
Voting Rights Act, ELECTION L. BLOG (Jan. 16, 2014, 1:32 PM),
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=58021 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (emphasizing
the distinction between statutory and constitutional violations, and predicting
that the amended § 3(c) would be struck down) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
244. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the discriminatory intent element to
trigger § 3(c) preclearance).
245. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives: Defending the New
Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 349, 354–55 (2006) (discussing cases decided
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“extraordinary,”246 “strong measure”247 of requiring federal
approval for state legislative enactments, “appropriate to
address”248 a constitutional harm, “may be an unwarranted
response to . . . lesser”249 statutory violations.250
after Boerne and the statutory violations for which the Court found the remedy
to be disproportionate).
246. Supra notes 121–22.
247. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Contra Brian F. Jordan, Note, Finding Life in Hurricane Shelby:
Reviving the Voting Rights Act by Reforming Section 3 Preclearance, OHIO ST.
L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (arguing that a results test for § 3(c) would not run afoul
of Boerne). Jordan posits three responses to the Boerne issues raised above: first,
that Boerne does not extend to legislation enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment
and thus a § 3(c) results test would only have to satisfy a rational-basis review
under Katzenbach; second—but related to the first point—that Boerne’s absence
in NAMUDNO and Shelby County means Boerne cannot be extended to the
Voting Rights Act; and third, that the Court’s composition could change,
pointing specifically to the advanced ages of Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Id. at
*43–46. Each misses the mark. First, the Voting Rights Act is not monolithically
cabined to the Fifteenth Amendment. Boerne itself recognized that the Voting
Rights Act had been upheld under the enforcement provisions of both the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (“We have
also concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within
Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments . . . .”).
Moreover, there is no “Katzenbach standard” to apply anymore: Shelby County
abrogated Katzenbach and its deferential stance toward the Voting Rights Act.
Time and again, the Court went out of its way in Shelby County to differentiate
modern conditions from those extant in the time of Katzenbach. See, e.g., Shelby
Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (contrasting modern conditions with the conditions
of the 1960s). The standard enunciated in NAMUDNO and Shelby County
does not stop with finding a rational relation—as Katzenbach did—but
instead requires also finding that “current burdens” are met by “current
needs.” Id. at 2630 (citing NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203). This also gets at
Jordan’s second point. Boerne may not exist by name in either NAMUDNO
or Shelby County, but the standard set out in those cases is little more than
a rewording of the Boerne standard. Under Boerne, the legislation must be
“congruent”; under Shelby County, it must be tied closely in time. Compare
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (requiring “congruence”), with Shelby Cnty., 133 S.
Ct. at 2630 (requiring “current needs”). Under Boerne, the legislation must
be proportional; under Shelby County, its burdens must be justified.
Compare Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (requiring “proportionality”), with Shelby
Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (saying that burdens on state sovereignty “must be
justified”). Finally, with regard to the possibility of a changing Court, it is
important to remember who wrote the majority opinions in NAMUDNO and
Shelby County: Chief Justice Roberts, not yet sixty years old. Biographies of
Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
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Introducing constitutional infirmity to § 3(c) is an
unfortunate incident to legislation that otherwise remedies many
of the VRA’s constitutional shortcomings.251 The proposed new
coverage formula updates automatically, snaring any state that
has committed five or more voting-rights violations in the
previous fifteen years and any “political subdivision” that has
committed three or more violations, or one violation with
“persistent, extremely low minority turnout,” in the previous
fifteen years.252 This formula keeps the coverage determination
tied to relatively recent conditions,253 a sharp departure from the
old § 4(b) that was “based on decades-old data and eradicated
practices.”254 It accepts the Court’s invitation in Shelby County to
“draft another formula based on current conditions,”255 and it
adheres to the implicit requirement in Boerne that the violations
being remedied be close in time to the remedy imposed.256
While the VRAA cures many of the ills that doomed the
preceding coverage formula, it also introduces new issues.257 The
new coverage formula defines “voting rights violations” to include
violations of § 2.258 This exposes it to the same Boerne problem
that the revised § 3(c) faces: because the violations are statutory
STATES , http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Sept.
24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Even if associate
Justices come and go in the near future, the intellectual force behind
NAMUDNO and Shelby County will almost certainly remain on the Court.
251. See Hasen, supra note 243 (describing the new coverage formula as
“likely constitutional”).
252. Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899 § 3(a)(1), 113th
Congress (2014).
253. See Hasen, supra note 243 (praising the VRAA’s new coverage formula
for being “tied to current conditions”).
254. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627 (2013).
255. Id. at 2631.
256. See Mark A. Posner, Time Is Still on Its Side: Why Congressional
Reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent
and Proportional Response to Our Nation’s History of Discrimination in Voting,
10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 97–98 (2006) (discussing the temporal
relation of voting-rights violations to § 5 preclearance in the context of Boerne’s
congruence-and-proportionality test).
257. See Hasen, supra note 243 (highlighting a potential constitutional
stumbling block).
258. See Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899 § 3(a)(1), 113th
Congress (2014) (including § 2 violations in the definition of voting-rights
violations).
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and not constitutional, the preclearance remedy may be
disproportionate.259 Unlike the amended § 3(c), the new coverage
formula would require a pre-determined number of violations
before preclearance could be imposed.260 In one sense, this makes
the coverage formula more congruent and proportional than
amended § 3(c) because § 3(c) preclearance could conceivably be
imposed for as few as two violations while § 5 preclearance would
not be imposed until the state or political subdivision crosses a
higher threshold.261 But because the new coverage formula
imposes the extraordinary remedy of preclearance as an
administrative or regulatory formula, instead of as an equitable
remedy at the conclusion of litigation particular to a given
jurisdiction, it retains the potential for over-inclusiveness
identified as far back as 1966.262
The VRAA misses the mark on policy fronts beyond its
potential legal shortcomings.263 It does not count Department of
Justice objections to voter ID laws among the violations
necessary to trigger preclearance in a given state.264 Given the
prominence of voter ID laws in the debate over modern voting
rights,265 their exclusion from the VRAA is grounds for
criticism.266 The coverage formula would encompass only four
259. See supra notes 241–49 and accompanying text (discussing the Boerne
standard and problems with the amended § 3(c)).
260. Compare H.R. 3899 § 3 (providing that five violations must occur before
a state must seek preclearance, and three violations or one violation with
“persistent, extremely low minority turnout” for political subdivisions), with
H.R. 3899 § 2 (amending the language of § 3(c) to require “violations,” but not a
given number).
261. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (comparing the language of
the VRAA sections).
262. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331–32 (1966)
(acknowledging that preclearance may be administered too broadly); supra
notes 126–34 (contrasting § 3(c)’s narrowness with § 5’s breadth).
263. See Berman, supra note 233 (noting that the VRAA “is certain to have
its critics”).
264. See Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899 §§ 2(a), 3(a),
113th Congress (2014) (exempting objections to photo identification
requirements); Berman, supra note 233 (reporting that voter ID laws will not
count as violations for § 3(c) or coverage formula calculations).
265. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text (describing voter ID
disputes in voting rights litigation).
266. See Press Release, NAACP, NAACP Statement on Proposed Voting
Rights Act Update (Jan. 16, 2014) [hereinafter NAACP Press Release], available
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states: Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.267 Six states
that were subject to § 5 preclearance would not be covered,268 nor
would northern states that have been at the forefront of enacting
stringent new limits on the franchise.269 This limited automatic
coverage means voting-rights advocates will have to continue to
rely on the “fire alarm” approach, sounding the bell through
litigation after the voting fires are set instead of preventing the
problematic policies in the first place.270 But the perfect need not
be the enemy of the good, especially in the face of ongoing,
pervasive racial discrimination in voting.271 Each of the VRAA’s
problems could be addressed with amendments and markups
before final passage.
Final passage, however, may never come.272 Reviving a
regulatory scheme long hated by those it covers,273 sections of
which were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court less
than one year ago,274 when its topic is a political lightning rod,275
is no small task for a legislature. With the 113th Congress on

at http://www.naacp.org/press/entry/naacp-statement-on-proposed-voting-rightsact-update (urging “revisions and amendments” to the VRAA, and objecting to
the “exceptions for voter ID laws”).
267. See Berman, supra note 233 (listing the states covered by the new
coverage formula).
268. See id. (identifying Alabama, Arizona, Florida, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia as the six states).
269. See id. (singling out Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin for their new
laws); Voter Identification Requirements, supra note 147 (including those same
three states among those with new voter ID laws).
270. See Cain, supra note 20, at 338 (describing the fire alarm approach);
NAACP Press Release, supra note 266 (criticizing the “reliance on costly
litigation”).
271. See MEX. AM. LEGAL DEF. FUND, NAT’L ASS’N OF LATINO ELECTED
OFFICIALS, & NAT’L HISPANIC LEADERSHIP AGENDA, LATINOS AND THE VRA: A
MODERN FIX FOR MODERN-DAY DISCRIMINATION (2014) (listing post-Shelby
legislation that restricts the Latino vote, and calling for passage of the VRAA).
272. See Hasen, supra note 243 (saying he is “very pessimistic about the
legislation passing out of the House”).
273. See supra pages 8–20 (recounting the litigation history of early
challenges to the Voting Rights Act).
274. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (ruling that
§ 4(b) was unconstitutional).
275. See supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text (describing political
opposition to voting rights enforcement).
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pace to be the least productive in American history,276 the ouster
of the only member of House GOP leadership to support the
VRAA,277 and the legislative filibuster still in place in the
Senate,278 the VRAA may never become law.279
VI. Conclusion
The future of the Voting Rights Act—and federal
enforcement of voting rights more generally—remains up in the
air following Shelby County.280 Today’s voting-rights advocates
will need to adopt the same spirit of pragmatic ingenuity of civil
rights leaders in the 1960s that led to passage of the first Voting
Rights Act.281 One approach could be enacting new legislation and
276. See David Welna, Congress Is on Pace to Be the Least Productive Ever,
NPR (Dec. 24, 2013, 3:22 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/12/24/256696665/
congress-is-on-pace-to-be-the-least-productive-ever (last visited Sept. 24, 2014)
(reporting that the first session of the 113th Congress passed only fifty-eight
public laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
277. See Ari Berman, Eric Cantor’s Defeat Is Bad News for the Voting Rights
Act, THE NATION (June 11, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://www.thenation.com/
blog/180194/eric-cantors-defeat-bad-news-voting-rights-act (last visited Sept. 24,
2014) (saying the VRAA “was written specifically with Cantor in mind,” and
“that Cantor planned to eventually announce his support for the bill”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
278. See Hasen, supra note 243 (noting that the filibuster is “alive and well”
in the Senate).
279. See Erika Eichelberger, Here’s Another Crazy Consequence of Eric
Cantor’s Loss, MOTHER JONES (June 11, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.mother
jones.com/politics/2014/06/eric-cantor-voting-rights-amendment-act (last visited
Sept. 24, 2014) (calling Cantor’s defeat in the primary “terrible news for voting
rights”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see Ron
Christie, Eric Cantor’s Last, Legacy-Burnishing Task: Update the VRA, THE
DAILY BEAST (June 16, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/
16/eric-cantor-s-last-legacy-burnishing-task-update-the-vra.html (last visited
Sept. 24, 2014) (calling on Cantor to push through the VRAA before he leaves
office) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
280. See JOSHUA FIELD, THE VOTING RIGHTS PLAYBOOK: WHY COURTS MATTER
POST-SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER 3 (Ctr. for Am. Progress 2014) (asking “what
must advocates, litigators, and lawmakers do to ensure that new, organized
attempts to make it harder for some citizens to freely cast their ballot are
properly countered?”).
281. See Peyton McCrary, Bringing Equality to Power: How the Federal
Courts Transformed the Electoral Structure of Southern Politics, 1960–1990, 5
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 686 (2003) (calling § 5 preclearance “[t]he most novel
feature of the [Voting Rights] Act”).
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adding new tools to the federal enforcement arsenal.282 But
assaults on the franchise are occurring in the here and now,283
and they must be confronted now without waiting on legislative
action. Section 3(c) gives federal officials and private litigants a
potent tool to confront and turn back those assaults.
Implementing the strategies identified in this Note will protect
the political participation of minority voters while passing
constitutional muster.

282. See Field, supra note 280, at 24–30 (suggesting legislative fixes to the
Voting Rights Act).
283. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013)
(acknowledging that “voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that”);
Holder, supra note 13 (discussing ongoing enforcement efforts and the
procedures being implemented in states previously subject to § 5 preclearance).

